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RECENT DECISIONS
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MoRTGAGES - SUBROGATION OF A VOLUNTEER - After the marriage
of the plaintiff to Victor Scheutz the latter's mother conveyed certain property
to Victor and his sister, Viola, subject to an outstanding mortgage which the
grantees assumed. Immediately after the completion of this transaction Victor
and Viola, with plaintiff joining to release her dower, executed deeds of reconveyance to their mother. Thereafter Victor, Viola, and their mother, and
plaintiff used the premises as a summer cottage until 1939, when plaintiff was
granted a divorce. In 1932 upon request by the mortgagee for part payment of
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the mortgage debt plaintiff paid it in full. In this action, instituted subsequent
to the divorce, plaintiff seeks to be subrogated to the lien of the mortgagee. Held,
plaintiff was a volunteer and may not invoke the relief sought. Schuetz v.
Schuetz, 237 Wis. 1, 296 N. W. 70 (1941).
It is generally said that one who is only a volunteer cannot invoke the aid
of subrogation, for such a person has no equity.1 While payment of a debt
secured by a mortgage extinguishes the mortgage so far as the mortgage creditor is concerned, it does not necessarily .have that effect as regards the person
making the payment. In favor of the latter the courts will frequently apply the
equitable doctrine of subrogation, under which one who has been compelled to
pay a debt which ought to have been paid by another is entitled to exercise all
the remedies which the creditor possessed against that other,2 and to demand
indemnity from the fund out of which payment should have been made. 3 One
who invokes the right of subrogation must (a) occupy the position of a surety, or
(b) have made payment under an agreement with the debtor or creditor that
he should have security therefor, or ( c) stand in such a relation to the mortgaged premises that his interest cannot otherwise be adequately protected. 4
The plaintiff in the principal case attempted to qualify under the third class. 5
Generally speaking this consists of those who, while not legally bound to pay,
might have suffered a loss if the obligation had not been discharged and hence
paid the debt in self protection. 6 The mere fact that a person pays the debt of
another does not entitle that person to a lien held for the enforcement of the
obligation.7 Equity will relieve only those who cannot relieve themselves. 8
Thus where a person was under no compulsion to pay the debt and could have
made an agreement for security, he cannot claim subrogation in the absence
of further facts according this right. Consequently it is not surprising to find
statements by almost all the courts to the effect that a mere volunteer is not
entitled to subrogation. 9 Plaintiff in the principal case attempted to escape the
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application of this rule by showing that in paying off the mortgage she was
acting under a reasonable and bona fide belief that she had some interest in the
property and had to pay the mortgage in order to protect that interest. She was
unable to prove either the reasonableness or good faith of this belief on her part
but the court indicates that had she been able to do so she might have prevailed.
This is in accord with the better view on the subject. In some courts it is apparent that an undiscriminating adherence to the maxim that subrogation will
not be granted a "volunteer" has led to a failure to recognize the subjective
elements, and has permitted results which defeat the doctrine of subrogation.10
Thus where attempts have been made to extend the doctrine beyond payments
to protect actual interests of the payor many courts have denied relief.11 Since
subrogation is a device to promote justice and is resorted to wherever equity
and good conscience demand,1 2 the artificial restrictions of the volunteer rule
should not be applied to preclude relief in cases where one pays the debt of
another under a reasonable belief that such action is necessary to protect an
interest which in fact is nonexistent.18 No new burden is created by allowing
subrogation in such a case, and the principal debtor should not be allowed to
escape his obligation at the expense of an innocent third party.
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